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THE VANISHING BODY OF DISABILITY
LAW: POWER AND THE MAKING OF
THE IMPAIRED SUBJECT*
Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry**
The influence of disability studies on legal scholarship is
most visible in the social model, which claims that people
are not disabled because of their bodily impairments, but
by society in its refusal to accommodate their
impairments.
However, a modest but growing discourse within
disability studies argues that the notion of impairment, in
addition to disability, is socially constructed. This article
aims to bring this problematized conception of
impairment, informed by Michel Foucault’s conception of
power, into contact with legal scholarship. Judith
Mosoff’s sensibility about the role of impairments in the
legal treatment of disabled people illustrates this critical
*

This title was inspired by Bill Hughes & Kevin Paterson, “The Social
Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body: Towards a Sociology
of Impairment” (1997) 12:3 Disability & Society 325, and by a subheading (“Foucault's vanishing body”) in Chris Shilling, The Body
and Social Theory, 2nd ed (London: Sage Publications, 2003) at 69.
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issue, Professors Susan Boyd and Isabel Grant, for their helpful
suggestions.
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outlook, which has the potential to guide scholarship and
legal reforms. For instance, in the context of family law,
those reforms could affect the evaluation of a person’s
fitness to parent or her right to childcare support.
The first part of this article makes a prima facie case for a
critical ontology of impairment and the second part
provides theoretical foundations for such a practice. I use
Supreme Court of Canada case law to illustrate how
impairments are typically naturalized and to begin
challenging impairment-based identities and detaching
disability from impairment.
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“By definition, of course, we believe the
person with a stigma is not quite human. . . .
We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology
to explain his inferiority and account for the
danger
he
represents,
sometimes
rationalizing an animosity based on other
differences. . . . We use specific stigma
terms such as cripple, bastard, moron in our
daily discourse as a source of metaphor and
imagery, typically without giving thought to
the original meaning. We tend to impute a
wide range of imperfections on the basis of
the original one . . .”1
1. RECLAIMING THE IMPAIRED BODY IN
DISABILITY LAW
WHAT CAN A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF
IMPAIRMENT DO FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP?
“Our bodily experience”, Alfred North Whitehead wrote,
“[is] so habitual and so completely a matter of course that
we rarely mention it. No one ever says, Here am I, and I
have brought my body with me.”2 The failure to consider
the body as a site of power and agency is widespread in
Western thought, from modernity’s Cartesianism to poststructuralism’s “dissolution of matter as a contemporary
1

Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled
Identity (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963) at 5.

2

Alfred Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press,
1968) at 114.
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category.” 3 Phenomenology 4 and “body studies” 5 are
important exceptions but remain peripheral to mainstream
disability studies and legal scholarship. 6 Judith Mosoff,
3

Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex
(New York: Routledge, 1993) at 27 [emphasis in original].

4

Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline (associated with
Edmond Husserl, Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, amongst others)
that could be approximately defined by its objects of enquiry
(consciousness or objects as experienced) or as a practice of
suspending our focus on (the existence of) the thing-in-itself (the
thing “behind” our perception) and shifting our attention to objectsas-experienced, or to our perceptual capacities. It notably included
(e.g., in Merleau-Ponty’s work) a focus on the role that our body
plays in experiencing the world and in constituting our consciousness
(David
Woodruff
Smith,
"Phenomenology", The
Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N
Zalta (ed), online: Stanford <plato.stanford.edu>).

5

Body studies can be defined as an interdisciplinary field that
investigates how human bodies are culturally inscribed and
represented; it pays particular attention to the social construction of
bodies and naturalization of such constructs, though it can also deal
with our representations of the “natural” body: Margo Demello, Body
Studies: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2014) at xvi.
Although it has earlier roots, and has come to include a variety of
disciplines (anthropology, sociology, philosophy, sports studies,
cultural studies, phenomenology, and dance), the field of “body
studies” is relatively recent and is probably best associated with a
“corporeal turn” in sociological scholarship (seminally illustrated by
the work of Bryan Turner) in the eighties onward. For a survey of
those developments by a leading scholar in the field, see Chris
Shilling, “The Rise of Body Studies and the Embodiment of Society:
A Review of the Field” (2016) 2:1 Horizons in Humanities & Social
Sciences: An International Refereed Journal 1.

6

I list, infra note 11, a body of scholarship within disability studies
that has integrated this concern for the body as a site of governance or
an object of cultural construction. While feminist legal scholars have

THE VANISHING BODY OF DISABILITY

11

however, provides an example of legal scholarship that
interrogates this widespread naturalization and erasure of
the body. In a discussion of the data collected about
disability-related complaints within a human rights
framework, she noted how severely cognitively impaired
individuals were not deemed as full subjects under human
rights law. In fact, institutionalized and psychiatricallydiagnosed bodies fell under a different (e.g., paternalistic)
jurisdiction.7
As Mosoff notes, courts sometimes justify their
refusal to intervene because diseases and impairments lie
beyond their jurisdictions. It is one thing to reject
disability claims because courts do not want to usurp the
political role of the state or the professional role of
medical experts. It is another to preclude “impaired
persons” from concerns of fairness, equality, dignity, and
freedom, all of which are within the jurisdictions of legal
actors. When legal actors believe that “impaired persons”
long paid attention to the control of women’s bodies (e.g., its
sexuality, its procreative capacities), the problematization of
impairment as a social construct is rarely theorized (exceptions
include Judith Mosoff’s work, as well as Hall, infra note 15; Kristin
Savell, “Sex and the Sacred: Sterilization and Bodily Integrity in
English and Canadian Law” (2004) 49:4 McGill LJ 1093; and Sheila
Wildeman, “Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy” in
two parts: (2015) 38:2 Dal LJ 619 and (2016) 39:1 Dal LJ 147. The
only work I know that systematically theorizes the construction of
bodies in legal thought is Alan Hydes, Bodies of Law (New Jersey:
Princeton, 1997)).
7

Judith Mosoff, “Is the Human Rights Paradigm 'Able' to Include
Disability: Who’s In? Who Wins? What? Why?” (2000) 26:1
Queen’s LJ 225 at 263. As this example suggests, I use “body” in a
broad way meant to encompass mental features as well.
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lie outside of their jurisdictions, they assume that their
“impairments” are value-neutral, power-independent,
biological facts. They implicitly endorse a naturalistic
view of the body, generally, and of impairments,
specifically. Such naturalistic views hold that:
Inequalities in material wealth, legal rights
and political power are not socially
constructed, contingent and reversible, but
are given, or at the very least legitimized, by
the determining power of the biological
body.8
This article takes issue with the assumption that
impairments are natural facts that fairly underlie disability
claims and justifiably delineate social expectations related
to “disabled people”. Instead, this article suggests that we
conceive of impairments as social constructions
expressing power over people by transforming them into
“impaired subjects”, whose freedom can be curtailed due
to their impairment, and whose impairment can only be
contested on a medical basis. Whereas the disabled legal
subject can contest her marginalization or oppression, the
impaired legal subject has few options for choosing or
contesting the legal frameworks applied to her. This
position follows a modest but growing body of literature
within disability studies that problematizes the “absent
presence”9 of impairment.10
8

Shilling, supra note 1 at 37.

9

Shilling, supra note 1 at 8; Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson,
“The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?” (2001) 2
Research in Social Science & Disability 9 at 14.
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QUESTIONING THE NATURALIZATION OF THE
CONCEPT OF IMPAIRMENT IN DISABILITY
LAW
In her article Motherhood, Madness, and Law, Mosoff
introduces her readers to Shirley, a client discharged
following a psychiatric hospitalization, and who
eventually surrendered custody of her child after “social
workers, public health nurses, and psychiatrists . . .
strongly suggested that her mental health impede[d] her
10

Here is a representative selection of this sub-field, in chronological
order: William Ray Arney & Bernard Bergen, “The Anomaly, the
Chronic Patient and the Play of Medical Power” (1983) 5 Sociology
of Health & Illness 1; Helen Liggett, “Stars are Not Born: An
Interpretive Approach to the Politics of Disability” (1988) 3
Disability, Handicap & Society 263; Alden Chadwick, “Knowledge,
Power and the Disability Discrimination Bill” (1996) 11 Disability &
Society 25; Margrit Shildrick & Janet Price, “Breaking the
Boundaries of the Broken Body” (1996) 2 Body & Society 93;
Hughes & Paterson, supra note 1; Shelley Tremain, “On the
Government of Disability” (2001) 27:4 Social Theory & Practice 617;
Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare, eds, Disability/Postmodernity:
Embodying Disability Theory (London: Bloomsbury, 2002); Shelley
Tremain, ed, Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2015); Margrit Shildrick, Dangerous
Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity and Sexuality (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); David T Mitchell, The Biopolitics of
Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral
Embodiment (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015). There
are earlier statements of the view that impairments are socially
constructed within other theoretical frameworks, such as Robert
Scott’s The Making of Blind Men (New York: Routledge, 1981), who
describe blindness as a “social role” that sight-impaired people “must
learn how to play”.
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from being a good mother.”11 This case was not isolated,
and Mosoff criticized both the authority of psychiatrist
experts to determine whether women were able to
perform the role of mothers and the deference of courts
toward medical expertise. Influenced by Michel Foucault,
she writes:
[W]hat unites the people who are associated
with psychiatry, psychology, and related
disciplines is that they are all seen in law to
have important expertise which assists in
explaining how the human mind works, how
a particular mind works, and how
personality is formed. In exercising the
accompanying power these professionals all
perform functions of surveillance and
control as designated state agents in modern
society.12
Mosoff concludes that judges ought to scrutinize
medical evidence more circumspectly when considering
whether a woman’s medical condition actually threatens
her child’s best interests. She reveals how medical
categorizations of impairments can conceal an ableist
ideology by shielding certain assumptions from rigorous
scrutiny. By “ideology”, Mosoff refers to “unquestioned
ideas and values that guide the way people in a culture
think and act . . . and pervade what are considered

11

Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45 U
Toronto LJ 107 at 107.

12

Ibid at 110–1.
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obvious ‘natural’ and true explanations”.13 Her reflections
show a particular sensitivity to how the notion of
impairment can become a discursive space where an
ableist ideology can manifest itself and go undetected.
The social model of disability claims that people
are not disabled because of their biological impairments,
but by society in its refusal to accommodate their
impairments. The social model has now found its way
into the mainstream of legal and political discourses.
Conceptualizing disability as a socially constructed
problem has freed a space for activists to claim that they
are disabled by society rather than by their bodies. This
has had the significant benefit of positioning the burden
of accommodation as one that the state must shoulder.
The social model of disability helpfully framed such
claims not as support for tragic losses, but as protection
against oppression, and as a demand that society remove
the social barriers arbitrarily blocking access to valued
social roles and opportunities. 14 Social modelists
presented their view as opposing a traditional “medical
model” of disability that equates disability with
impairment. The Union of Physically Impaired Against
Segregation published the classical formulation of the
distinction between the concepts of impairment and
disability at the root of the social model in 1976. It

13

Ibid at 108.

14

For early theorizations of the social model, see Vic Finkelstein,
Attitudes and Disabled People (New York: International Exchange of
Information in Rehabilitation, 1980); Michael Oliver, The Politics of
Disablement (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990).
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reflects a medical understanding of “impairment” and a
social understanding of “disability”:
Impairment: Lacking part or all of a limb, or
having a defective limb, organism or
mechanism of the body; Disability: The
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused
by a contemporary social organisation which
takes no or little account of people who have
physical impairments and thus excludes
them from the mainstream of social
activities.15
In legal scholarship as well, disability—not
impairment—became a ground to complain against
discrimination and claim equal protection and benefit. 16
Impairment is generally taken to be a necessary
component of disability but is not a concept used to
discuss how disabled people are oppressed or
discriminated against. This is clear from the cases in
which the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed at least two
elements from the social model of disability: (i) a
dichotomy between impairment and disability and (ii) the
use of the latter concept to discuss social barriers and

15

UPIAS, Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: Union of
Physically Impaired Against Segregation, 1976) at 3–4.

16

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11, s 15(1) [Charter]; see also various provincial and federal human
rights laws, such as the Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, that enumerate disability as one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination.
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entitlements to their removal. 17 Justice Sopinka, writing
for a majority of the Court in 1997 in Eaton v. Brant
County Board of Education, stated:
Exclusion from the mainstream of society
results from the construction of a society
based solely on “mainstream” attributes to
which disabled persons will never be able to
gain access. Whether it is the impossibility
of success at a written test for a blind
person, or the need for ramp access to a
library, the discrimination does not lie in the
attribution of untrue characteristics to the
disabled individual. The blind person cannot
see and the person in a wheelchair needs a
ramp. Rather, it is the failure to make
reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune
society so that its structures and assumptions
do not result in the relegation and
banishment of disabled persons from

17

Note that the Supreme Court of Canada sometimes uses the notion of
“handicap” to denote what social modelists would call “disability”,
and sometimes uses the notion of “disability” to denote what social
modelists would call “impairments”. Those semantic choices do not
impede our discussion, as long as we keep track of concepts used to
refer to medical, unalterable facts falling outside the reach of social
redress and of the law, and concepts used to denote social problems
that the law can address or are understood by scholars and legal
actors as denoting, or potentially importing, prejudiced assumptions
about differently embodied human beings.
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participation, which results in discrimination
against them.18
Justice Sopinka thus places impairments (such as
blindness and motor impairment) outside of a discussion
of ableist discrimination. Those are “true” individual
characteristics, which are not the product of stereotyping
but are rather natural, value-neutral facts upon which
discrimination occurs. Social obstacles exclude impaired
people from mainstream society. Social obstacles turn
impaired persons into disabled persons. Social failures,
Justice Sopinka writes, result in discrimination toward
impaired persons; that is, they cause disability. Judges do
not examine whether and how the prior identification of
the individual as “impaired” potentially contributes to a
person’s disability-qua-oppression.
Justice Binnie, in Granovsky, writing for a
unanimous Court in 2000, reiterated the same dichotomy
between impairment and disability, and held that equality
rights are meant to correct social obstacles imposed on
impaired people, that is, intentional or unintentional social
barriers through which the state blocks access to equal
benefits and protection under the law:
The Charter is not a magic wand that can
eliminate physical or mental impairments
. . . Nor can it alleviate or eliminate the
functional limitations truly created by the
impairment. What s.15 of the Charter can
18

[1997] 1 SCR 241 at 272, 142 DLR (4th) 385 [Eaton cited to SCR]
[emphasis added].
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do, and it is a role of immense importance,
is address the way in which the state
responds to people with disabilities. Section
15(1) ensures that governments may not,
intentionally or through a failure of
appropriate accommodation, stigmatize the
underlying physical or mental impairment
. . . or fail to recognize the added burdens
which persons with disabilities may
encounter in achieving self-fulfilment in a
world relentlessly oriented to the ablebodied.
It is therefore useful to keep distinct the
component of disability that may be said to
be located in an individual, namely the
aspects of physical or mental impairment,
and functional limitation, and on the other
hand the other component, namely, the
socially constructed handicap that is not
located in the individual at all but in the
society in which the individual is obliged to
go about his or her everyday tasks.19
Therefore, the conventional wisdom in disability
studies and disability law is that impairment is a natural,
value-neutral—as opposed to socially engineered—
phenomenon, typically detectable and classifiable through
medical expertise. Disability, on the other hand, is a
socially constructed, value-laden phenomenon.
19

Granovsky v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[2000] 1 SCR 703, 186 DLR (4th) 1 [Granovsky cited to SCR].
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Like any new paradigm, the social model of
disability was exposed to a myriad of criticisms. For
instance, many “impaired/disabled people” feel that their
subjective experience of impairment, rather than
oppression, characterizes their disabled identity, or that
some “impaired/disabled people” do not see themselves
as oppressed. Other scholars questioned whether the
impairment/disability dichotomy, like the sex/gender one,
was sustainable.20 Some of these criticisms partly misfired
because they attacked social modelists for failing to
address issues they were not interested in. However, the
matter becomes more controversial if social modelists are
not only “uninterested” in dealing with disability-qua“subjective experience of impairment” but also suggest
that discussion of “disabled identity” should be refrained
from unless it conforms to the framework of the social
model. If so, social modelists would undermine other
people’s use of this term to speak of issues, experiences,
and identity distinct from social oppression.21
In response, new models of disability were
developed. Current references to a “social model” may
therefore not necessarily refer to the version popularized
by Michael Oliver and others22 as these scholars do not
20

For a survey of these criticisms, see Shakespeare & Watson, supra
note 10.

21

See Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, “Beyond (Models of) Disability?”
(2016) 41 J Medicine & Philosophy 210.

22

See Oliver, supra note 15; Finkelstein, supra note 15. This has been
recently reaffirmed, for instance, in Michael Oliver & Colin Barnes,
The New Politics of Disablement (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012).
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endorse the claim that disability is solely caused by social
vectors. Instead, many endorse versions of a social model
that might be more aptly called “mixed” or
“multidimensional” models insofar as they retain the
insight that disability is caused by social factors, but reject
the view that disability is exclusively caused by such
factors.23
Theorists who endorse mixed or interactional
models of disability typically allow for some social
constructivism in the constitution of disability but adhere
to (some version of) an ontologically realist position when
it comes to impairments. Even Tom Shakespeare, who is
very attuned to the complex processes through which a
disabled identity is formed, endorses a “critical realist”
perspective on impairment. He writes: “while different
cultures have different views or beliefs or attitudes to
disability, impairment has always existed and has its own
experiential reality.”24
The controversial compromise between medical,
social, experiential and other models of disability is the
view retained by the World Health Organization (which
adopted a “bio-psycho-social” model25) and possibly by
the Supreme Court of Canada. On the one hand, as the
extracts above suggest, the Court seems to recognize that
23

See e.g. Jerome Bickenbach, Ethics, Law, and Policy (New York:
Sage Publishing, 2012) at 14–15.

24

Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (New York:
Routledge, 2006) at 54.

25

World Health Organization (WHO), International Classification of
Functioning, Disability and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2001).
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disabilities have varying causes, which would take it
closer to a mixed model of disability. On the other, the
Court says that it cannot do anything regarding the
biological or medical causes and that discrimination law
is only about particular social causes of disability, a
position closer to that of traditional social modelists.
Whichever position the Court may come to endorse on the
issue of causality, my comment is the same: whether the
Court sees impairment as a sine qua non condition, but
not a cause, of disability-qua-oppression, or as one of the
causes of disability-qua-mixed-phenomenon, it does not
consider impairments to be socially constructed or
created. Impairments are “true characteristics” 26 that are
believed to lie outside the reach of ideology, stigma,
oppression, or disciplinary apparatuses.
THINKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT AND POWER
DIFFERENTLY
A natural reflex of a social justice scholar, upon hearing
that “impairments” may themselves incorporate
unquestioned prejudices, would be to expand an enquiry
into stigmatizing attitudes toward impairments. This
strategy, while measurably helpful in some ways, would
confirm, rather than challenge, the assumption that there
is an entity at which prejudicial attitudes are directed and
that this entity itself is a “natural fact”. Such a scholar
may also be keen to combat stigma by accepting the
notion that impairments are constructs and looking for
another natural fact (e.g., “differently embodied persons”)
that may be discriminated against. She may hold that
26

Eaton, supra note 19 at 272.
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doctors and lawyers would turn those natural facts about
people into inherently stigmatized impairments, just as
ableist employers and discriminatory state policies would
turn impairments into disabilities. The well-meaning
quest for justice within the confines of liberal legal
scholarship would take the form of a pursuit of the subject
unencumbered by stigma in order to free her.
Alternative philosophical traditions, however,
would resist the temptation to look for a subject whose
status is not tainted by ideology, that is, a subject whose
needs and preferences could be authentically understood
in abstraction from the “vagaries of circumstance”27: the
subject lying behind the “differently embodied subject”,
itself lying behind the “impaired subject”, itself lying
behind the “disabled subject”. Social justice scholars are
committed to attempting this perpetual regression because
of their liberal understanding of the subject as preceding
power. Liberal theory traditionally justifies the state’s
authority to exercise power by seating it on the will of
subjects who are postulated to exist beyond the reach of
power that they themselves exercise and transfer to the
state. An alternative theory of the subject, found in the
work of Michel Foucault, denies that subjects precede
power. This alternative view considers how power may be
exercised through practices such as undergoing medical or
judicial scrutiny and how subjects actively participate in
the production of knowledge about themselves in a way
that would legitimize their various treatments, from
institutionalization to financial support.
27

Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed
(Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 19.
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The suggestion that the agency of subjects is
orchestrated by forces that ought to be scrutinized is
potentially problematic for liberalism, as it undermines
the liberal conception of freedom and the strategies
undertaken to achieve it. In addition to their
understanding of the subject, a connected reason why
legal scholars working within a mainstream liberal
framework fail to see the usefulness of a Foucauldian
approach is because of their understanding of power.
Here, I define power broadly as “compliance-securing
mechanisms” 28 to capture both the kind of centralized
power exercised by the state that liberals are traditionally
preoccupied with and the kind of “micro-powers that are
exercised at the level of daily life”29 that Foucault and his
followers investigate. Instead of reducing power to
something done to an unencumbered subject, these
theorists understand the subject as constituted by a
reiterative process of practices, performances and
discourses in which both the subject and others take part.
Instead of understanding power as exercised by a
dominant group over a subjugated one, this approach
understands power as exercised through the subject’s
identity and agency. As Foucault writes:
[P]ower reaches into the very grain of
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts
itself into their actions and attitudes, their
28

Stevens Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed (New York: Palgrave
McMillan, 2005) at 88.

29

Michel Foucault, "Body/Power" in Colin Gordon, ed,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–
1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 59.
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discourses, learning processes and everyday
lives. The eighteenth century invented [a
regime of power exercised] within the social
body, rather than from above it.30
Such non-directly coercive, but regulative
mechanisms include the medico-legal determination that
Shirley would be allowed to visit her child under
supervision in order to determine whether she was a fit
guardian. Mosoff describes her client being “heavily
medicated and very sad”:
[Shirley’s] supervised access visits to her
baby . . . were observed by those who would
eventually be called to give evidence about
her capacity as a mother. Her visits with the
baby took place through the haze of
medication which blurred her vision, made
her mouth dry, and rendered her movements
stiff. She was told to be spontaneous and
demonstrative with the child.31
This disheartening description arouses a sense of
injustice, because the expectations of being spontaneous
and demonstrative seem questionable, especially given
Shirley’s medicated state:

30

Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk" in Colin Gordon, ed,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–
1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 39.

31

Mosoff, supra note 12 at 107.
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Eventually [Shirley] agreed that she needed
to remove herself from her child in the best
interests of the child. The case ended with a
consent order giving permanent custody to
the superintendent so that the child could be
adopted. . . . Mothers with mental health
histories may themselves be convinced that
it is best to give up their child without a
hearing.32
Of interest is that the case was solved through
Shirley’s own agency. Through engaging with medical,
welfare or legal frameworks, “differently embodied
people” 33 (hereinafter DEP) come to see themselves
32

Ibid at 107, 128.
I will sometimes use the term “differently embodied people” (or the
acronym DEP) to keep a lexical distance from the terms “disabled
persons” and “impaired persons”. By “differently embodied people”,
I refer to people with unusual experiences or needs related to their
particular embodiment, and I mean to encompass any physical and
neurological differences without committing either to a particular
source of authority to define those differences (as the medical model
does when it relies on medical experts to identify “impaired
individuals”), to particular experiences (such as someone’s subjective
appreciation of one’s own situation), or to particular stigmas
compounding one’s situation (as the social model does by claiming
that social factors cause “disability”). The term “differently embodied
people” is not itself immune to criticism (notably, the term “different”
prompts the question: different from what?). I am not necessarily
claiming that this is a term that has any more truth about the broad
umbrella of disability-related concepts or that it identifies a core
shared by all of those concepts. I only suggest that it is helpful to
discuss the specific notions I deal with in this paper to gain
conceptual distance from “impairment” and “disability” when and if
needed.
33
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differently. Regulated “impairment talk” is one of the
mechanisms through which DEP come to endorse “what
others see as [their] failing, inevitably causing [them], if
only for moments, to agree that [they do] indeed fall short
of what [they] really ought to be.”34
If the “disabled subject” or the “impaired subject”
never escapes power relations but is rather constituted by
them, a mode of resistance for scholars and advocates for
people in Shirley’s situation might be to question the
expectations imposed on mentally ill women performing
the role of mothers.35 A critical analysis of the mothering
practices of women with mental health diagnoses—
including an analysis of paternalistic supervision by
medical and legal bodies—would render visible a prelegal normative framework of “proper mothering” more
or less taken for granted by legal actors enforcing it. Of
interest to Foucauldian scholars would be the practices of
inviting women to submit themselves to medical and
judicial forms of scrutiny that require them to meet a set
of unquestioned standards. Such processes, which are
inscribed within invisible power relationships, inherently
limit the conceptual horizon of recourses available to
DEP.
Shirley’s story demonstrates a form of knowledge
production and shows us how “knowledge-based power”
(by contrast to repressive power) operates. We ‘learn’ that
34

Goffman, supra note 2 at 7.

35

Jane C Murphy, “Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting
Definitions from Welfare Reform Family and Criminal Law” (1998)
83 Cornell L Rev 688.

28 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

Shirley is unfit to be a mother, indeed through her own
statement. It was her ‘confession’, but also the
unquestioned process, tied up with power relations, that
constituted her into an impaired subject with limited legal
options. We may call this kind of knowledge
“confessional knowledge”.36 This notion emphasizes that
“disabled people” are invited or pressured to identify
themselves within legal (and other social) frameworks
that not only serve their explicit purposes but also mold
the social roles, self-understanding, relations with others,
and agency of DEP.
In the case of Shirley, the supervised visits with
her child, displaying her parental capacities, constituted
the setting of her “confession”. Another illustration of the
production of confessional knowledge in legal settings is
when judges interrogate potential witnesses with
cognitive impairments to test whether they can act as
witnesses. Cognitive impairments are traditionally taken
to be an objective basis to justify some people’s exclusion
from the witness stand, while the notion of a “normal
witness” goes largely unquestioned. 37 Since testimonies
arguably construct reality, what follows is an erasure of
harms endured by cognitively different individuals and a

36

I refer to the Foucauldian idea that subjects produce knowledge about
themselves—and transform themselves in the process—in a
confessional manner. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol.1,
translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) at
58–62.
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Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, “The Intellectually Disabled Witness and
the Requirement to Promise to Tell the Truth” (2017) 40:1 Dal LJ 1.
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reinforcement of their social exclusion.38 Confession can
also take the form of filling extensive Disability Living
Allowance forms about one’s “toilet needs”. Subjects
accept undergoing such a production of knowledge about
themselves because it can give them access to certain
benefits, such as being allowed to parent one’s child,
testify in a case against one’s aggressor, or access social
support.39
The act of “confessing” transforms the confessor;
in legal contexts, it changes her status, sometimes for the
worse. Whereas Mosoff exposed paternalistic practices
through which women are asked to show that they can
reach the status of mothers fit to parent, Shildrick and
Price focus on the “self-generated and self-policed
behaviours” that welfare claimants engage in to satisfy
“disciplinary economies” that require “goods and desires”
to conform to what is considered normal:
No area of bodily functioning escapes the
requirement of total visibility. . . . The
welfare claimant is controlled not by a
38

For instance, by asking a proposed witness with cognitive impairment
whether she’s been “told about God”, whether she’ll go to jail if she
tells “big lies”, or whether she’s heard the expression “I promise to be
good, mommy”, a judge would not only be examining testimonial
reliability, but also naturalizing a specific conception of a “normal
witness”. (Those questions, though deemed to be inappropriate by the
Supreme Court, were asked at trial to a proposed witness with a
mental disability, as reported in R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5 at para 84,
[2012] 1 SCR 149.)
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Margrit Shildrick & Janet Price, “Breaking the Boundaries of the
Broken Body” (1996) 2 Body & Society 93.
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display of external coercion but by
continuous surveillance. . . . [Through] the
Disability Living Allowance claim form, she
produces herself as a disabled subject.40
This degree of invasiveness and control over
individuals’ private lives seems to belong to a dystopian
novel, and yet it is commonly tolerated because
knowledge-based
power
goes
unnoticed:
its
manifestations are assumed to be objectively necessary
ways of dealing with the essentialised abnormality of
certain individuals. While seeming to attend to the
individuality of a disabled person’s needs, the welfare
forms considered by Shildrick and Price universalize the
unique individual claimant and turn her into a manageable
“impaired subject”. Power is therefore partly exercised
through the self-enforcement of norms by the subject
herself. Legal texts and policies not only coerce the
subject but guide her self-understanding and selfregulation.
Even in coercive settings, the law’s invitation to
perform rituals that will allow individuals to qualify as
victims, claimants, witnesses, etc. do not fit a traditional
understanding of coercion. The requirement to meet those
40

Ibid at 103–4. Mosoff, supra note 12 at 109–10, similarly reports that
“[b]ecause mothers with mental health histories are often portrayed as
dangerous or potentially dangerous to their vulnerable children . . .
women can expect the smallest and most intimate details of their lives
to be considered legitimate subject matter of the public domain . . .
[b]ecause of a medical/scientific assertion about a person that creates
and names her difference, such women have little claim to any
vestige of privacy.”
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status-granting criteria are presented as natural
necessities. Knowledge-based power is exercised at this
early stage of qualifying to participate in the legal sphere
as a full legal subject. Even if it becomes possible for
DEP to challenge repressive power on specifically
recognized grounds within the legal sphere, it will often
be after having submitted their unusual bodies (and
connected needs and capacities) to the invasive scrutiny
of medical and legal actors who act as gatekeepers to
crucial resources and opportunities.
The most compelling reason for liberal scholars to
endorse a critical posture toward their own endeavours is
that a repressive view of power captures only the rarest
and most visible uses of power. In an article criticizing
the unnecessarily normalizing impetus of medical
interventions, Anita Silvers report that many adults born
with a limb malformation regret “having had their natural
digits amputated, being fitted with ineffective artificial
arms, and forbidden to use the much more functional
method of manipulating objects with their feet”. 41 It is
hard to imagine a more invasive use of power than one
driving parents to consent to their children’s amputation
so that they would look a little more “normal”. Yet, this
kind of power is typically invisible. Impairments were
used in the instance described by Silvers as a ground for
exercising power for the benefit of those children. Liberal
narratives of power operate on such beneficial, welfare-

41

Anita Silvers, “On the Possibility and Desirability of Constructing a
Neutral Conception of Disability” (2003) 24 Theor Med Bioeth 471
at 475.
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maximizing grounds42 (e.g., it is for the best interests of
children to be removed from their mother’s custody or,
given a certain set of congenital conditions, never to have
been born). Even well-meaning medical practices and
legal discourses related to disability can perpetuate the
subjugation of the “impaired subject”. As Judith Butler
puts it, “we may seek recourse to matter [in our case:
impairment] in order to ground or verify a set of injuries
or violations only to find that matter [impairment] itself is
founded through a set of violations.”43
To explore what a critical ontology of impairment
may look like within disability legal scholarship, the rest
of this article examines the theoretical foundations of such
a practice, potential political-legal manifestations of it,
and objections to both the foundations and practice of a
critical ontology of impairment.
2. TOWARD A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF
IMPAIRMENT IN DISABILITY LAW
CONSTITUTING AND MAINTAINING AN
IMPAIRED IDENTITY
Differently embodied people are often attributed statuses
(medical ones like “diseased”, “impaired”, “disabled”, or
degrading ones found in popular culture like “freak”) that
confine and orientate the exercise of their freedom. For
instance, some report that “women who have disabilities
42

Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique. Cours au Collège de
France, 1978–1979 (France: Seuil/Gallimard, 2004).

43

Butler, supra note 4 at 29.
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are seen as being sexless, unattractive, unmarriageable
and generally non-female”.44 Through social activism, the
status of a “person with disabilities” has been cast under a
more positive light, but it remains commonly associated
with the role of the sick.45 As a result, many differently
embodied people reject the status of a “disabled
person”.46 This is pragmatically doable if they do not need
to endorse this status in order to be processed within
welfare, anti-discrimination, workplace integration, or
punitive legal frameworks.
The acquisition and parameters of the status of an
“impaired person” are harder to challenge. 47 Social
modelists have negotiated a space for a disabled identity
to be worn as a political badge promoting anger rather
than sadness, hope rather than despair, strength rather
than docility. The same cannot be said of an impaired
identity, which social modelists have been accused of
44

Sharon Barnartt, “Using Role Theory to Describe Disability” (2001)
2 Res in Social Science and Disability 53 at 61, referring to Michelle
Fine & Adrienne Asch, “Disability Beyond Stigma: Social
Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism” (1988) 44:1 Journal of
Social Issues 3.
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Saad Z Nagi, “Some Conceptual Issues in Disability and
Rehabilitation” in MB Sussman, ed, Sociology and Rehabilitation
(Washington: American Sociological Association, 1970) at 104.

46

Nick Watson, “Well, I Know this is Going to Sound Very Strange to
You, but I Don't See Myself as a Disabled Person: Identity and
Disability” (2002) 17:5 Disability & Society 509 at 522.
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This is for reasons similar to those given by Saad Nagi for
distinguishing the role of a “sick or ill person in a hospital or clinic”
as that of a patient and the role of a “disabled person in a
rehabilitation setting” as that of a client. Nagi, supra note 45 at 106.
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having surrendered to medical experts, leaving it to them
to define “impairments” and prescribe expectations
attached to it.48 A medical, value-neutral understanding of
impairment is theoretically possible, 49 but some find it
“politically naïve” 50 while others suggest that it flies in
the face of the history of the use of statistical sciences by
the state to manage public health, 51 as well as of the
emergence of the figure of the “chronic patient”. 52 One
could also object to a value-neutral conception of
impairment because empirical data indicates that
impairments are, in practice, negatively valued by both
able-bodied and disabled people.53

48

See Hughes & Paterson, supra note 1; Tremain, supra note 11.
Although these criticisms may have a de facto purchase, I note that
social modelists like Michael Oliver endorse a “structural account” of
impairment that challenges the “personal tragedy theory [that]
impairments are chance events happening to unfortunate individuals”.
Oliver holds that “impairments are not randomly distributed
throughout the world but are culturally produced.” Oliver, supra note
15 at 12, 14.
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and Disadvantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Such a negatively charged understanding of
impairment may come to be incorporated into one’s
identity through different practices and discourses:
unpleasant routines, failure to socialize, lack of
spontaneity connected to an obligation to plan ahead, and
formally asking for support. 54 Through the performance
of such practices, the differently embodied person
becomes an “impaired subject”, sometimes described in
ways reminiscent of the biomedical model that constructs
disability as medical condition and a personal tragedy.55
Eve, a self-described “sad lonely character” with multiple
sclerosis reports:
Well, you are so much trouble to people. . . .
I just feel that before everything happened
things were good and boyfriends were on
the scene and marriage was on the scene and
everything changed with MS.56
The goal of genealogizing impairment would be to
understand how culture, ideology or power transformed
Eve into an impaired person and orchestrated her selfunderstanding. Surely, Eve cannot theorize her medical
condition away. To carry out a critical ontology of
impairment requires us to qualify what is meant by
“social construction” to avoid the criticism that “the
constructivist refutes the reality of bodies, the relevance
of science, the alleged facts of birth, aging, illness, and
54

Ibid at 522.
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Ibid at 522–23.
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Ibid at 523.

36 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

death.” 57 One need not suggest that reality is only a
function of language to argue that impairments are
socially constructed. One may concede that a natural
substrate of some kind underlies “impairment” and still
hold that any effort to define and describe it cannot avoid
contributing to, rather than strictly describing, this
phenomenon. We may think of social construction as a
kind of co-creative or interpretative exercise rather than a
creation ex nihilo.58
Mainstream disability studies and legal
scholarship have effectively “concede[d] the body to
medicine”59 and limited the scope of their constructivist
critique. To challenge how impaired identities are
formulated and used within legal frameworks, we need to
begin articulating impairment and disability differently.
EMANCIPATORY STRATEGIES
A critical ontology of impairment can serve to support at
least two emancipatory strategies: (1) the strategy of
challenging power by denying, resisting, and redefining
the impaired status imposed on DEP and (2) the strategy
of articulating disability claims independently from the
concept of impairment.

57

Butler, supra note 4 at 10, 28.
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Ibid at 10.
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(i) Challenging Cultural Appreciations of One’s Bodily
Differences
As Shakespeare and Watson argue, impairments are
“experientially salient” to many disabled people. 60
Hughes suggests that people with visible disabilities may
be more prone to “experience their bodies as an influential
presence [in the context of everyday social encounters]”.
Whereas the body is “normally taken for granted by most
people in most situations”, visible disabilities draw
attention to the power of the body. 61 Some, like Jenny
Morris, would therefore prioritize the development of a
“disability culture [that] give[s] [people with different
embodiments] the confidence to take pride in our
difference, to assert that we have an experience which is
valid and important”. 62 Otherwise, social modelists may
be recruiting demoralized soldiers who can hardly attach
an activist badge on their bruised identity, which has
already incorporated the expectations associated with an
“impaired person”. If endorsing the social model’s
political badge of “disabled” requires one to give in to the
medical understanding of impairments, many DEP may
choose to avoid this identity.
Those difficulties have led “second wave”
disability theorists to be skeptical of identity politics
60

Shakespeare & Watson, supra note 10 at 15.
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Bill Hughes, “Disability and the Body”, in Colin Barnes et al, eds,
Disability Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity 2002) at 71.
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within the disability movement. While some would detach
emancipatory discourses from any kind of selfidentification as an impaired person (see next section),
others prefer to redeem the notion of impairment,
precisely because embodiment—and the experience of
one’s embodiment in a world of differently embodied
people—is salient to the life and identity of many
disabled people. The disability movement may follow
Morris’s advice to develop a more positive “impaired
status”. Morris gives the example of deaf people who
“because they have a separate language . . . often have a
clearer sense of a separate culture and history than do
other groups of disabled people.” 63 Such cultural
reframing of embodied experiences of difference in a
more positive or empowering way, sustaining a
recognition of identity rather than the material
redistribution primarily sought by social modelists, may
do more for people like Shirley and Eve than the social
model could.64
A large body of reflections authored by disabled
people could contribute to this cultural shift. The key
virtue of this strategy is that it helps disabled people
regain control of the construction of an impaired identity.
Scholars like Carol Thomas and Bryan Turner express
concerns over such narratives becoming too idiosyncratic
and being “largely devoid of historical and sociological
63
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content”. 65 However, they are not intended to replace
political movements, but only help those movements stay
connected to the actual concerns of their constituencies.
Moreover, underestimating the value of personal
narratives within social struggles risks failing to see the
political in the personal and vice-versa.66
However, social modelists like Colin Barnes and
Michael Oliver have expressed concerns that a focus on
impairment (or difference, or different embodiment) “will
only de-politicise the social model” without yielding any
alternative models that may be operational within
“campaigns to improve or defend the lifestyles of disabled
people”.67 Criticisms in this vein resemble arguments in
favour of identity politics. Responses may therefore take
the form of traditional attacks on identarian politics, such
as the fact that group identities put forward in
emancipatory struggles may not be adequately
representative or may be assimilationist.68
65
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(ii) Detaching Disability-Related Claims from
Impairments
A political alternative is to detach impairments from
disability claims altogether. This approach would
radically sever any connection with the medical model of
disability (which holds that disability and impairment are
co-extensive). It would also depart from the mainstream
“Russian nesting doll” model of disability generally
endorsed by the social model and a variety of authorities
that keep impairments at the heart of the concept of
disability by making it a necessary condition for disability
to exist, even though it severs the causal relation between
impairment and the ideological and power-related
dimensions of said disability. Rather than “secur[ing] the
political freedom of a particular [impaired] constituency”,
the disability movement would need to organize its
political platform around “belief systems, programmatic
manifestos, or party affiliation”.69 What would it mean to
articulate disability claims without relying on the notion
of impairments? This question asks whether the disability
movement—historically defined around a group
identity—can coherently abandon identitarian politics for
a more profitable alternative. It asks what other values
and manifestos could be endorsed by social actors
preoccupied with the fate of DEP.
Articulating disability claims beyond a shared
identity may be less sacrilegious than it seems to social
modelists. The heterogeneity of the group of “disabled
people” is such that there is no unifying membership
69
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criterion to the “disability community” other than
impairment. Thus, empirical research like that of Watson
suggests that much disability activism “rests on an
unreflexive acceptance of the distinction of disabled/nondisabled”.70
The Mercier case at the Supreme Court of
Canada71 provides us with a platform to begin discussing
what a post-identity approach of disability might look like
in legal terms. Three individuals complained to the
Quebec Human Rights Commission for having been
discriminated against on the basis of their disability.72 Ms.
Mercier and Mr. Jean-Marc Hamon had spinal cord
anomalies and were not hired by municipal bodies to
work. Another municipality refused to hire Mr. Palmerino
Troilo, the third appellant in Mercier, because he had
Crohn's disease. This case raised the question of whether
the complainants were “disabled” in a legal sense,
considering that they were all asymptomatic.
The American Supreme Court had held that the
status of being impaired, in and of itself, did not suffice to
bring someone under the purview of the American with

70

Watson, supra note 46 at 525.
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Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
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Disabilities Act (ADA). 73 Impairments are, under the
ADA, necessary but insufficient conditions to constitute
disability; they have to cause substantial limits on major
life activities. 74 The trial judge who dealt with Ms.
Mercier’s and Mr. Troilo’s cases followed the American
Supreme Court’s logic. The three complainants had
impairments in that they had a physiological dysfunction.
However, being asymptomatic, their impairments did not
amount to a functional limitation. Therefore, Judge
Brossard concluded that Ms. Mercier and Mr. Troilo's
“physical anomalies” did not amount to them having
“handicaps for the purposes of s. 10 of [Quebec's Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms] because they do not
suffer from a disadvantage or disability that results in a
functional limitation.”75
The significance of an “impaired” or “disabled”
identity is highlighted in cases where failing to properly
identify oneself effectively deprives claimants of legal
standing or legal positions. As an illustration of the irony,
an employer tells a person with a “physical anomaly”: “I
won’t hire you because you’re disabled.” The prospective
73
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employee answers: “No, I’m not. I’m perfectly able to do
the work”. The employer concludes: “Good! It means
that you won’t be able to sue me.” It is to prevent such
unfair outcomes that Justice Rivet, presiding over the
Hamon case at the trial level, found that actionable
discrimination could be based on limitations, even
“limitations attributed in error”. In doing so, she grounded
a disability claim on stigma or prejudiced assumptions
alone.76
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and
held that the applicants had been victims of
discriminatory exclusion because being impaired was
enough to classify someone as handicapped.77 The Court
of Appeal equated disability with impairment (i.e., it
endorsed the medical model), which provided relief for
Troilo and Mercier, who had actual physiological
anomalies, but would have failed to help people
stigmatized on the basis of falsely attributed
characteristics.
The Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing that
the “nature of discrimination is often subjective” and
“may be based as much on perception and myths and
stereotypes as on the existence of actual functional
76

Ibid at paras 15–17.
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limitations,” 78 followed Justice Rivet, rather than the
Court of Appeal, in detaching disability from impairment.
The Supreme Court did not, however, endorse a
general stigma-based conception of disability that would
altogether detach disability from the idea of the body.
Prejudices are still “body-related” even if they are
grounded in imaginings. Otherwise, it would be hard to
distinguish disability from any other ground of
discrimination.79 In fact, other grounds like age or sex are
also closely related to human embodiment, so we need to
further narrow the kind of stigma associated with
disability by connecting it to “abnormal” bodies. Having a
female or an aged anatomy attract stigma, but if a young
man would look like an older woman, then the stigma
associated with his attributes would be related to
disability, as understood here, because prejudices would
not be directed at his female or aged bodily features, but
at the fact that those bodily features differ from a young
man’s “normal” body.
Although Justice L’Heureux-Dubé claims to be
incorporating the social model into Canadian law, 80 it
78
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seems that the Court offered a distinct “discrimination
model” of disability in Mercier. 81 Justice L’HeureuxDubé does not require a cumulation of factors typical of
multidimensional models of disability. One need not be
disabled by one’s body and by society. Her definition is
more open-ended: “a “handicap” (i.e., disability) may be
the result of a physical limitation, an ailment, a social
construct, a perceived limitation or a combination of these
factors.”82 She refuses to provide a narrow definition of
disability, because “what is a handicap today may or may
not be one tomorrow”. 83 Her “discrimination model” of
disability could be interpreted as merely requiring
physical or mental features that attract stigma. If her
open-ended definition of disability is read as detaching
the concept of disability from the notion of physiological
anomaly, other traits attracting this stigma—like
unconventional looks, unattractive appearances, or
obesity—would fall under this definition. On the other
hand, she says that having a cold or having blue eyes
would not count as disabilities because they do not attract
negative biases.84
para 80). She also explicitly incorporates into her judgment Jerome
Bickenbach’s terminology of a “social phenomenon of handicapping”
(ibid at para 83), as well as his focus on the socio-political
dimensions of disability (ibid at para 77).
81
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This discrimination model of disability comes as
close as an actual judicial model can to David
Wasserman’s plea for a de-medicalized interpretation of
disability discrimination under the ADA. 85 Wasserman
argues that protection against disability discrimination
should extend to any “disfavored physical and mental
variations.”86 If the goal of human rights legislation is to
protect “some of the least advantaged and most
stigmatized members of society”, it would be counterproductive to ignore how “disabling habits of thoughts
and social practices” 87 function. Waserman’s stigmabased approach to disability (or Mercier’s discrimination
model of disability) would turn our attention to how and
why stigma functions and invite analyses of a history of
negative affective responses toward “abnormal bodies”.88
This more open-ended approach better captures arbitrary
prejudices against different forms of embodiment not
clearly associated with historically oppressed groups or
defined within the narrow confines of “medical anomaly”.
Extending the protection of human rights law would
protect and respect a wide range of people who do not fall
within the traditional conception of “disabled people” but
still struggle with “body prejudice”.
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One the other hand, this approach would deprive
courts of clear, easily supported criteria to establish
disability discrimination. Canadian Courts have long tried
to overcome the difficulty of proving discriminatory
attitudes by relying on “facts” such as impairments and
different treatments 89 to establish discrimination by
effects rather than by intent.
Some legal literature suggests avenues to
articulate equality claims on the basis of fundamental
interests90 and vulnerability,91 and the same could be done
around stigma 92 and disability/impairment. These
concepts can be taken to be conditions which might apply
to everyone rather than as descriptors of an “insular and
discrete” identity. For instance, according to Goffman, the
notion of stigma refers to any discrediting feature and
only acquires a stigmatizing dimension within specific
contexts. 93 With regard to disability specifically, Irving
Zola has popularized the view that disability is a universal

89

Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56
DLR (4th) 1; See also Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5,
[2013] 1 SCR 61 in which the Court distanced itself from too thick an
attitudinal analysis of discrimination.

90

Robin Elliot & Michael Elliot, “The Addition of an Interest-Based
Route into Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 64 Sup Ct L Rev (2d)
461.

91

Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition” (2008) 20:1 Yale JL & Feminism 1.

92

Wasserman’s chapter, supra note 85, is a contribution to this
enterprise.

93

Goffman, supra note 2 at 2–5.

48 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

condition, so that social and legal measures should deal
with disability and impairment accordingly:
[A]n exclusively special needs approach to
disability is inevitably a short-run approach.
What we need are more universal policies
that recognize that the entire population is
“at risk” for the concomitants of chronic
illness and disability.94
The parameters of a principled approach to weigh
the merits of disability claims on grounds other than
impairments remain embryonic and this is perhaps the
challenge that disability law scholarship must confront
head on. Zola’s universalist model, often echoed in
disability studies, lays the theoretical grounds to
legitimize “universal design" claims in a way that would
not require claimants to constitute themselves into
impaired subjects of power.
Shelley Tremain and Wendy Brown recommend
that “protest[s] against marginalization or subordination”
take the political form of demanding “what we want”
rather than of stating “who we are”, since making claims
on the basis of “impairments” will necessarily “appeal to
the very identity upon which [the] subjection [of DEP]
94

Irving Zola, “Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability
Policy” (1989) 67:2 The Milbank Quarterly 401 at 401. See also JE
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of Disablement" in M Jones & LA Basser Marks, eds, Disability,
Divers-Ability and Legal Change (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999)
101.
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relies.” 95 We can therefore assert that we want an
inclusive society, and avoid explaining why we deserve it
on the basis of an impaired identity. As Brown explains,
this political language would recover “the moment prior
to [one’s identity’s] own foreclosure against its want”.96
Theorists of justice would contribute to this endeavour by
formulating justifications for a society inclusive of DEP
that would not capitalize on tragic or medical descriptions
of impairments. For instance, one may develop the view
that a fair society ought to design its institutions from the
point of view of a diversity of human bodies, or that a fair
society would enforce a principle of accessibility that
would preclude requiring different people (outsiders,
others, DEP) to normalize, or even identify, themselves
before having access to some goods.97
In practice, it is probable that both strategies
considered above will take the form of new identity-based
claims. This is because of the robust political tradition of
expecting people who make disability claims to
submissively create and maintain a pedigree of “impaired
subject” prior to making requests to various social actors
(the welfare state, judges, not to mention personal
relationships). It is concretely difficult for disabled people
95
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to avoid abiding by current frameworks expecting an
impaired identity from them.
Nonetheless, formulating these new, more
inclusive98 identity-based claims would already constitute
progress, if they provide grounds for claims that would
not require discrediting oneself, 99 that is, the public
endorsement of a stigmatized identity, tied with
undesirable normative consequences. 100 A critical
ontology of impairments could therefore be appropriated
by proponents of identity politics as a tool to expand their
understanding of an impaired identity, even without
moving beyond identity-based claims altogether.101 I tend
to agree with Sheila Wildeman that “an anti-identitarian
98
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ethic of resistance to epistemic violence” does not
necessarily require “a wholesale shift from the politics of
mental health to a post-identity politics”. 102 It may not
only lay the grounds for new political identities, but also
for novel political uses of identity that would be a new,
more adjustable and responsive, kind of identity politics.
Better understanding impairments would not
exempt disability theorists from also examining how
experiences of impairment and disability relate. An
exclusive focus on embodiment risks “marginalizing the
sensual, discourse, and the emotions”. 103 I am not
suggesting that impairment is any kind of new
Archimedean standpoint that would provide stability to
the concept of disability, but rather that (naturalized)
abnormal embodiments are currently used unreflectively
as such a standpoint.
I do not have the space to deal extensively with a
final objection that a critical ontology of impairment
ought to rebut: the claim that Foucauldian and other poststructuralist conceptions of impairments as a site of power
and resistance leave no space for agency and freedom.
Some believe, for instance, that Butler’s performative
understanding of agency 104 or Foucault’s conception of
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the body105 either pre-determine the subject or render her
passive. These criticisms have been addressed by poststructuralist scholars. 106 In short, simply because
structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives on agency
investigate the strings manipulating the puppet does not
mean that they deny the possibility of freedom; these
perspectives may, instead, be read as qualifying the nature
of freedom that we do possess. Moreover, this last
challenge to a critical ontology is unlikely to faze legal
scholars. Even if they were convinced that certain
conceptions of power, agency or impairment are myths,
these myths acquire political capital. In legal matters,
success may well depend upon appealing to established
myths rather than on ontological (dis)proofs.
CONCLUSION
This article has suggested ways of integrating into legal
scholarship insights from a modest body of literature
within disability studies that problematizes the concept of
impairment. The central objection to developing
emancipatory practices through a critical ontology of
impairment is that its use as an identity marker is
necessary to social, political, and legal struggles to foster
the social inclusion of DEP. This objection assumes that
traditional identitarian politics cannot continue in parallel
to developing alternative disability discourses. This
105
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assumption is questionable: it might just as well be said
that theoretically divergent disability discourses may feed
off each other’s political successes. (Consider how both
anti-discrimination ideals and universal design ideals sit
together throughout the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.)
The reward of questioning the social construction
of impairments within medical, social and legal
discourses, on the other hand, is real and promising.
Scholars and practitioners would be equipped with a more
sophisticated array of concepts to assess how DEP are
socially excluded, not only through measures exercised
against them but through a myriad of practices and
discourses that construct them interpretatively as
“impaired”. In the legal field, this “impaired legal
subject” is positioned in ways that define and limit the
recourses available to her. This awareness is empowering
insofar as it provides us with further sites of resistance to
challenge treatments of DEP that would insidiously
reassert an identity that harms, rather than benefits, them
and that subjugates, rather than frees, them.
Tobin Siebers goes so far as to argue that an
impaired identity has not been problematized as a social
construct nearly as much as other minority identities. This
would explain why its use as a tool of domination
“remains in full force”. Race or gender, for instance, are
typically suspicious justifications when invoked in
circumstances implying inferiority, but the same cannot
be said of common (e.g. tragic or compensatory) ways of
depicting and dealing with “the disabled”:
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[T]he prejudice against disability 107 . . .
[provides] seemingly credible reasons for
the belief in human inferiority and the
oppressive systems built upon it. This usage
will continue. . . until we reach a historical
moment when we know as much about the
social construction of disability as we now
know about the social construction of race,
class, gender, and sexuality. Disability
represents at this moment in time the final
frontier of justifiable human inferiority.108
Working out the implications of the thesis that our
bodies are sites of power and agency within legal and
political fields that assume bodies are natural objects and
are premised upon disembodied conceptions of power and
agency may require radical changes. Such changes should
not alarm social justice scholars and disability activists
because they think these would deprive them of helpful
categories to carry out their worthwhile struggles. On the
contrary, if they are truly concerned with the
emancipation of “persons with disabilities”, they cannot
afford to ignore the fact that legal frameworks which
seem to cater to the special needs of “people with
107
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disabilities” are not value-neutral.109 Whether one uses the
idiom of repressive power, ideology and stigma to detect
ableist assumptions underlying legal norms, or the
Foucauldian notion of regulatory power to understand
how profoundly they control differently embodied human
beings, 110 the point is to dislodge the concept of
impairment from its medical pedestal. Bringing the
109
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construction of its materiality under critical scrutiny will
“permit the term to occupy and to serve very different
political aims”, which will more than make up for the
temporary epistemological uncertainty it may occasion.111
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